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INTERESTSOF AMICI CURIAE~
The question in this case is whether the issuance
of a permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
("Army Corps" or"Corps") authorizing petitioner Coeur
Alaska, Inc., to discharge millions of gallons of
wastewater containing tailings from its gold mine into
a pristine lake that is a navigable water of the United
States violates the Clean Water Act ("the Act"). The
Ninth Circuit answered that question in the
affirmative.
This brief in support of respondents is filed on
behalf of the following Members of Congress: Frank
Pallone, Jr., Pete Stark, Maurice Hinchey, Donald
Payne, Raul Grijalva, Jan Schakowsky, Rosa DeLauro,
Rush Holt, Mike Honda, Dennis Kucinich and Earl
Blumenauer. Amici are Members of a number of
Committees that have jurisdiction over environmental
matters, including the Natural Resources Committee,
the Energy and Commerce Committee, the Education
and Labor Committee, the Ways and Means
Committee. and the Appropriations Committee. Amici
have a strong interest in ensuring the Act is properly
implemented. Each amicus represents a district
containing navigable waterways potentially affected by

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, no counsel for a party authored
this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made
a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
No person other than amici curiae or their counsel made a
monetary contribution to the briefs preparation or
submission. This brief is filed with the written consent of
the parties, which is on file with the Clerk of the Court.
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the outcome of this case.
At bottom, this case presents a question of
congressional intent namely, whether Congress gave
the Army Corps the authority to issue a permit
allowing the discharge of industrial pollutants into
navigable waters that the Act otherwise forbids. Amici
are uniquely situated to address this question.
Although amici submit this brief in their individual
capacities, not on behalf of Congress, their views are
informed by their considerable experience as Members
of Congress.
In amici’s view, the Ninth Circuit correctly ruled
that the permit issued by the Army Corps violated the
Act. The Act mandates uniform compliance with
discharge standards for industrial wastes established
by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The
Corps’ limited authority to issue permits for
construction and navigation projects in no way
supplants EPA’s exclusive authority over waste
disposal. Indeed, the position advocated by petitioners
disregards the Act’s clear text, invites an end-run
around EPA’s sole authority to authorize the discharge
of wastewater, and gives mining companies incentives
to dump their wastes into rivers and lakes and not on
land. Adopting petitioners’ approach would promote
large-scale dumping of industrial wastes into the
waters of the United States exactly the dumping the
Act was designed to end.
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BACKGROUND
1. The permit in question in this case was
issued by the Army Corps to grant Coeur Alaska, Inc.,
permission to discharge contaminated waste, known as
process wastewater, directly into waters of the United
States. Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 486 F.3d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 2007)
("SEACC’). Section 402 of the Act gives EPA exclusive
authority to issue permits for the discharge of
industrial pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Section 404 of
the Act provides a limited exception to EPA’s otherwise
exclusive permitting authority by granting to the Army
Corps the power to issue "dredge and fill" permits for
the placement of "fill material" into waters of the
United States -- that is, when it is necessary to use
"fill" to construct bridges, dams, piers, or other
infrastructure, or to alter water flow to facilitate
navigation. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1344(i). Nothing in
Section 404 authorizes the Army Corps to issue
permits for the discharge of industrial pollutants or, for
that matter, waste products of any kind.
To ensure that no discharge of industrial wastes
regulated by the Act deviates from EPA standards,
Sections 301 and 306 of the Act subject all discharges
to uniform discharge standards set and administered
by EPA. And EPA has, in fact, set a zero discharge
standard for precisely the kind of gold-mine waste
Coeur Alaska seeks to discharge. In 1982, EPA
conducted a survey of waste disposal methods in use at
gold mines across the nation and concluded that waste
disposal techniques resulting in zero discharge into
waters of the United States were routinely and cost-

effectively employed. 47 Fed. Reg. 54,598, 54,602 (Dec.
3, 1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 25,682, 25,692 (June 14, 1982).
For this reason, EPA established a "zero discharge"
standard for gold mines that use the froth-flotation
process to separate valuable ore from waste, as would
Coeur Alaska’s mine. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1).
There is no question that, had Coeur Alaska sought a
permit from EPA, the application would have been
denied under EPA’s twenty-six-year-old zero discharge
rule.2
2. Coeur Alaska instead sought a permit from
the Army Corps under Section 404 of the Act, which
authorizes the Corps to issue "dredge and fill" permits,
to allow its Kensington Mine to discharge heavily
polluted wastewater into Lower Slate Lake. See
SEACC, 486 F.3d at 640. Coeur Alaska plans to extract
gold from the Kensington Mine and then separate it
from waste rock using a process known as frothflotation. Id. at 641. Coeur Alaska will remove rock
from the mine, grind it into fine gravel, and pump it
(along with various chemicals) into large water tanks
where the froth-flotation process occurs. Id. The
addition of chemicals causes bubbles to form around
the gold-bearing ore and float to the top of the tank,
where the ore is skimmed off. Id. Some of the
remaining material known as tailings can be redeposited in the mine. But a significant amount (as
2 This standard effectively requires Coeur Alaska to
dispose of waste products from its froth-flotation mill either
on land or in protected impoundments such as artificial
ponds lined with impermeable membranes. SEACC, 486
F.3d at 641.

much as 4.5 million tons in this instance) must be
discarded elsewhere. Id.
In 1997, Coeur Alaska sought and was granted
a permit to build a dry tailings facility on land near the
mine, which would not have involved the discharge of
wastewater. Id. at 641-42. Rather than spend money
to build the facility, Coeur Alaska instead proposed in
2001 to dam nearby Lower Slate Lake and use the lake
as a dump site for the tailings-laden wastewater, which
would be discharged into the lake in the form of a semiliquid "slurry." This discharge would raise the bottom
of the lake by approximately fifty feet and cause the
lake’s surface area to triple in size. Id. The
wastewater contains a number of toxic substances,
including aluminum, chromium, copper, lead and
mercury, which would cause substantial environmental
damage to this pristine lake and adjacent wetlands.
Id. at 642; see also Respondents’ Br. at 4. Coeur
Alaska applied for. and received, a permit from the
Corps under Section 404 of the Act. This is the first
time the Corps has issued a permit allowing a gold
mine operator to discharge process wastewater into
waters of the United States.
The Corps’ issuance of this permit was a
departure from the Corps’ longstanding interpretation
of its authority under Section 404. Until 2002, the
Corps took the position that its permitting authority
over "fill" was limited to fill used for construction or
navigation. In 1975, the Army Corps defined "fill
material" to mean material used to replace an aquatic
area with dry land or to raise the elevation of a water
body. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,325 (July 25, 1975). In
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1977, the Corps clarified that "fill material" is material
used for the "primary purpose" of construction or for
navigational safety. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,145
(July 19, 1977). In contrast, if material was placed in
a water body "primarily to dispose of waste," the waste
was not fill material and thus EPA, not the Corps, had
jurisdiction under Section 402. Id.
In 2002, the Army Corps redefined "fill material"
to embrace anything at all that, when dumped in a
water body, raises the elevation, and abandoned the
"primary purpose" test for waste. 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129
(May 9, 2002). Because industrial wastes sink to the
bottom of a water body and raise its elevation, the
Corps’ expanded definition of "fill" threatened to
arrogate authority the Act assigns to EPA. To avoid
dispute over their respective jurisdiction, the Army
Corps, together with EPA, appended to the new
definition a statement clarifying that neither agency’s
authority would change as a result of the rule-making.
Id. at 31,130; see also id. at 31,135.
In 2005, however, the Army Corps did an aboutface and issued a "dredge and fill" permit to Coeur
Alaska. The permit authorizes the discharge of
210,000 gallons of wastewa~er daily into the Lower
Slate Lake; a discharge that cannot be reconciled with
EPA’s zero discharge standard. If the discharge is
allowed to proceed, it will result in millions of gallons
of wastewater contaminated with chemicals and
containing 4.5 million tons of suspended solids such as
pulverized lead and mercury being flooded into a
pristine take surrounded by wetlands in the Tongass
National Forest. SEACC, 486 F.3d at 642. The lake

would be rendered a "dead lake," unable to sustain life
and unsuitable for human use, and the pollution would
spread to nearby wetlands, causing untold
environmental harm. Id.
3. Three conservation organizations, Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council, Sierra Club, and Lynn
Canal Conservation, challenged the Corps’ decision in
United States District Court for the District of Alaska.
These groups contended that Coeur Alaska’s actions
were governed by the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permitting program set
up under Section 402 of the Act, and in particular by
the 1982 EPA regulation prohibiting the "discharge of
process wastewater to navigable waters from mills that
use the froth-flotation process." Coeur Alaska and the
State of Alaska intervened on behalf of the Corps and
filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
district court granted. Id. at 643.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. In finding the
Corps’ permit invalid, the court relied on the text of
Sections 301 and 306 of the Act, which make unlawful
any discharge that does not comply with applicable
effluent and performance standards. Id. at 646-48. In
so holding, the court rejected Coeur Alaska’s argument
that Congress had created an implied exemption for
permits sought under Section 404. Instead, the court
found that Congress intended the existence of a
discharge standard or limitation implemented through
Section 402 to preclude the issuance of a Section 404
permit. Id. at 647-48.
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The court also noted that when the two
permitting agencies
EPA and the Corps -promulgated a joint regulation regarding fill material
in 2002, both the regulation and their joint statements
emphasized the continuing applicability of previous
discharge standards and permitting practices. Id. at
651-53. Because EPA promulgated a standard for
process wastewater of the type the Kensington mine
will produce well prior to 2002, the court concluded
that the Corps’ issuance of a permit to Coeur Alaska
was at odds with the agencies’ position that the Corps
lacked authority to issue a permit under Section 404
where, as here, a discharge standard is in force. Id. at
653.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Arnici join in respondents’ more comprehensive
treatment of the issues in this case. Amici file this
brief to highlight two points:
First, the Clean Water Act refutes petitioners’
claims. The Act prohibits the Army Corps from issuing
permits that authorize the discharge of process
wastewater into our nation’s navigable waters. Indeed,
the Act was passed for the very purpose of maintaining
and improving the quality of the nation’s waters by
reducing pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The Act does
so by directing EPA to control the disposal of waste
into waters of the United States. ld. § 1342. At the
same time, the Act withdrew the expansive authority
previously exercised by the Army Corps under the
Refuse Act, confining the Army Corps to discrete power
to issue "dredge and fill" permits to enable construction
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of infrastructure projects like jetties and piers, so long
as they do not obstruct navigation. See id. § 1344.
Congress reposed authority only in EPA not the
Army Corps to license waste disposal in waters of
the United States. Id. § 1342.
This reading of the Act is confirmed by the Act’s
history. One event leading to the enactment of the Act
was the wholesale discharge of mining wastes into the
Great Lakes. The Act was passed to eliminate
dumping of industrial waste into our nation’s rivers
and lakes, and, in the interim, to ensure that no
dumping takes place without EPA’s approval. See
generally Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F. 2d 492
(8th Cir. 1975). Amici’s reading of the Act is also
confirmed by EPA’s interpretation of the Act as
forbidding the "discharge of process wastewater to
navigable waters from mills that use the froth-flotation
process."
Second, petitioners’ argument should be rejected
because it flies in the face of longstanding, consistent
administrative interpretation by both EPA and the
Army Corps, which holds that only EPA, and not the
Corps, may authorize discharges subject to an effluent
standard issued by EPA.
Petitioners’ argument is further flawed because
it seeks to expand the term "fill material" far beyond
its established meaning. Petitioners claim that mine
waste contains materials similar to fill, and therefore
the Army Corps properly issued Coeur Alaska a permit
under Section 404 of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. But
this argument collides with the unavoidable fact that
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the word "fill" is a term of art: It refers to material
used to fill a space to facilitate construction. By no
stretch is "fill" a synonym for "waste" or "any collection
of solid materials," as petitioners claim. Indeed,
petitioners’ argument has no limiting principle. If
their reading of the statute were correct, a company
could get a Corps permit to dump any pollutant into
navigable waters of the United States by calling it
"fill," so long as it would raise water levels, even if the
waste’s discharge was otherwise forbidden by EPA, and
even if the discharge was only for waste disposal.
The Army Corps’ unprincipled departure from
these settled administrative interpretations threatens
to destabilize a statutory and regulatory regime that,
by and large, has operated as Congress directed in the
Act. The Ninth Circuit was right to invoke principles
of regulatory consistency in vacating the permit the
Corps issued to Coeur Alaska.
ARGUMENT
The Clean Water Act Vests EPA With
Exclusive Authority To Issue Permits
Authorizing The Discharge Of Industrial
Wastes.
The question in this case is whether the Clean
Water Act authorizes the Army Corps to issue a
discharge permit to Coeur Alaska allowing
contaminated wastes to be dumped into waters of the
United States. Answering that question "depends
upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the
purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any
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precedents or authorities that inform the analysis."
Dolan v. United States, 546 U.S. 481,486 (2006). See
also Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct.
1994, 2000 (2007). The text, purpose, history, and
longstanding administrative interpretation of the Act
all point in the same direction: Only EPA may issue a
permit authorizing the discharge of waste into the
navigable waters of the United States.
A. The Act’s Text.
The Act’s core goal is to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters" by "elimin[ating]" the "discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters." 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a). To accomplish this goal, Sections 301 and 306
of the Act require EPA to establish pollution control
standards that must be imposed on all industrial and
municipal discharges pursuant to the NPDES
permitting program under Section 402. 33 U.S.C. §§
1311, 1316, 1342. See also, e.g., Ass’n to Protect
Hammersley, Eld, & Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc.,
299 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
imposition of standards via the Section 402 permit
program is the "cornerstone" of the Act); Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (stating that Section 402 permitting is
"central to the enforcement" of the Act).3

~ The Clean Water Act received broad backing as a
much-needed pollution control measure. The 92ndCongress
conducted a major review of existing water pollution laws
(continued...)
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Section 402 of the Act grants EPA exclusive
authority to issue permits for the discharge of waste
including industrial waste into the waters of the
United States. According to Section 402, "[p]ermits for
discharges associated with industrial activity shall
meet all applicable provisions of this section." 33
U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3) (emphasis added). There is no
question that mining is an "industrial activity," and
not an infrastructure project like the construction of a
bridge, dam or pier. Therefore, any discharge of
mining waste into the waters of the United States
must be authorized by a permit issued in accordance
with Section 402, or the discharge is unlawful.4

~(...continued)
and enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, now known as the Clean Water Act.
The Act passed the Senate unanimously and the House by
an overwhelming majority. Senate Report and Debates,
reprinted in A Legislative History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (hereinafter "ALH") at
222; House Report and Debates, ALH at 277. President
Nixon vetoed the bill because of fiscal concerns. See Federal
Water Pollution Act--Veto Message, Oct. 17, 1972, ALH at
137. Congress overrode that veto with landslide votes. See
House Debate on Overriding the President’s.Veto of S. 2770,
ALH at 95-96, 109-13; Senate Debate on Overriding the
President’s Veto of S. 2770, ALH at 135-36.
4 In contrast, Section 402(/)(2), states that NPDES
permits are not required for mine runoff that has not been
contaminated with mine waste:
The Administrator shall not require a permit under
(continued...)
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Section 301 drives home that the Act’s pollution
control standards are not discretionary and that any
permit under Title IV, which embraces Sections 402
and 404, must comply with those standards. Section
301 provides that, "[e]xcept as in compliance with this
section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and
1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)
(emphasis added). See also Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715, 723 (2006) (stating that Section 301’s
prohibition is one of the "principal provisions" of the
Act).
Congress’s crafting of Section 301 merits close
attention. First, Congress used the connector "and" in
setting out the general rule that "[e]xcept as in
compliance with this section and sections.., of this
title." including Sections 306, 402 and 404, the
discharge of pollution "shall be unlawful." Congress’s

4(...continued)
this section, nor shall the Administrator directly or
indirectly require any State to require a permit, for
discharges of stormwater runoff from mining
operations.., which are not contaminated by contact
with. or do not come into contact with, any
overburden, raw material, intermediate products,
finished product, byproduct, or waste products
located on the site of such operations.
§ 402(/)(2). This provision makes sense because permits are
required under Section 402 for any mine runoff which has
been contaminated by mine waste. Subsection (/) would
make no sense under petitioners’ reading of the Act.
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use of "and" instead of "or" was deliberate. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74 (1984); Reiter
v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1979). As the text
makes clear, Congress did so to ensure that every
permit issued under the Act complies with the
pollution control requirements of Section 301 as well as
the separate and additional requirements of the section
authorizing the issuance of the permit. SEACC, 486
F.3d at 655. See also S.D. Warren v. Me. Bd. of Envtl.
Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 376-78 (2006) (giving text of Clean
Water Act everyday meaning).
Second, and of equal significance, Congress’s
repeated use of the word any underscores Section 301’s
breadth. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S.
1, 5 (1997); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604
(1986). The Section was plainly written to ensure that
"the discharge of any pollutant by any person" is
unlawful, unless the person has obtained a permit that
complies with Section 301. There is no exception to
this requirement; the provision’s language is
categorical.5

5 This understanding of the Act was widely shared at
the time it was being drafted. In comments on the draft
legislation, EPA’s Administrator observed that "[e]ffluent
limitations required by Section 301 would be established
and applied to all point sources of discharges covered by the
Act by means of the permits issued under Title IV." H.R.
Rep. No. 92-911, reprinted in ALH, at 844. See also E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 (1977)
("It is clear that Congress intended these [Section 301]
regulations to be absolute prohibitions.").
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Another section reinforces amici’s reading of the
Act. Section 306(e) provides that it "shall be unlawful
for any owner or operator of any new source to operate
such source in violation of any standard of performance
applicable to such source." 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e). Again,
Congress’s repeated use of the word "any" drives home
the categorical nature of this prohibition- the
provision makes it unlawful for any operator of any
new source to violate any applicable performance
standard, period. There is no way to square the Corps’
issuance of discharge permit to Coeur Alaska with the
unambiguous dictate of Section 306(e). There is no
dispute that the Kensington mine is a "new source"
subject to EPA’s zero discharge standard. Nor does the
language suggest an exception. Thus, in the language
of Section 306(e), a discharge of waterborne mining
wastes into waters of the United States would be "in
violation" of a "standard of performance applicable to
such source."
This reading of the Act is also consistent with,
and preserves, the narrow authority the Act confers on
the Army Corps to issue permits. Under Section 404,
the Army Corps’ permitting authority is limited to
"dredge and fill" construction and navigation projects;
it does not extend to the disposal of industrial wastes.
33 U.S.C. § 1344.
Section 404 of the Act makes this clear in two
ways. To begin with, Subsection 404(f)(1) describes
operations with "dredge and fill" components exempted
from regulation. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1). These
operations include: farming; water conservation;
maintenance and reconstruction of pre-existing

16
structures "such as dikes, dams, levees, groins, riprap,
breakwaters, causeways, and bridge abutments or
approaches, and transportation structures";
"construction of temporary sedimentation basins on a
construction site which does not include placement of
fill material into the navigable waters"; and
"construction or maintenance of farm roads or forest
roads, or temporary roads for moving mining
equipment," so long as navigable waters are "not
impaired" and "any adverse effect on the aquatic
environment" is minimized. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A)(F). The words "construction" and "navigation" run
through these descriptions of exempted dredging and
filling activities for a reason dredging and filling are
activities integral or related to construction and
infrastructure projects. See id.
Next, Subsection 404(f)(2) defines those "dredge
and fill activities" that are not exempted and therefore
may not be undertaken without a permit. Under
Subsection (f)(2), a permit is required for the "[1]
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters incidental to any activity having as its purpose
bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to
which it was not previously subject, [2] where the flow
or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or
the reach of such waters be reduced." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(f)(2) (emphasis added). The first clause defines
the discrete scope of the Army Corps’ jurisdiction,
encompassing only discharges that are incidental to
construction activities requiring deposits into waters
such as the building of bridges or dams that might
have an impact on navigation. Id. The second clause
sets forth thepurpose for which a permit may be issued
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by the Corps, which is to ensure the safety and nonobstruction of navigable waters. Id. Read together,
the two subsections of Section 404(f) make evident that
the Corps’ permitting authority is limited to activities
undertaken for purposes relating to "dredge and fill"
operations; that is, operations necessary for
infrastructure development and navigation in waters
of the United States.
The text of the Act resolves this case. The
"dredge and fill" permit the Army Corps issued to
Coeur Alaska is invalid not just because its issuance
exceeded the Corps’ authority under Section 404, but
also because the permit violates Section 30 l’s "absolute
prohibition" on the discharge of waste without a permit
properly issued by EPA under Section 402 of the Act,
as well as Section 306(e)’s prohibition against
discharges by "new sources" in violation of EPA
established performance standards.
The Act’s History and Purpose Support
Amici’s Reading.
This conclusion is bolstered by a review of the
drafting history of the Act. One of Congress’s chief
concerns was to eliminate the exact kind of discharge
Coeur Alaska seeks permission for -- that is, the
dumping of process wastewater or waterborne solid
waste into waters of the United States. At the time the
Act was making its way through Congress, several
Members of Congress were trying to force the Reserve
Mining Company to stop dumping 67,000 tons of
taconite tailings daily into Lake Superior. See, e.g.,
Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference
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Committee, Oct. 4, 1972, reprinted in ALH at 190-94
(remarks of Sen. Griffin of Michigan); see also Reserve
Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 530-31 (8th Cir.
1975). Reserve Mining operated a taconite mine in
Minnesota’s Mesabi Iron Range, but placed its mill (the
beneficiation plant) on the shore of Lake Superior. Id.
at 500. Reserve Mining had been dumping process
wastewater into the lake for decades, causing extensive
water contamination and threatening the safety of
residents who drank the lake water and used the lake
for fishing and recreation. Id. at 530-31. The Act was
designed in part to put an end to that dumping. See 33
U.S.C. § 1311, 1316, 1342.
Prior to the passage of the Clean Water Act, the
Army Corps was responsible for regulating deposits
into waters of the United States, including waste
disposal, under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1899. The Corps had issued permits for
construction, deposits of fill and other potential
obstructions to navigation under Section 10 of that Act
(33 U.S.C. § 403), and had recently instituted a permit
program for industrial waste discharges under Section
13 (33 U.S.C. § 407), more commonly known as the
Refuse Act. The Clean Water Act transferred to EPA
responsibility for permitting and standard-setting for
waste discharges, leaving the Corps to administer only
the construction and navigation-related dredge and fill
permitting process.
The impact of this near-total reallocation of
authority was evident in the Reserve Mining case. Just
three years after the Act’s passage, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
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Reserve Mining Company’s dumping of process
wastewater into Lake Superior, conducted pursuant to
a permit issued under 33 U.S.C. § 403 (Section 10 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act) authorizing the company
to "deposit railings from the ore processing mill" into
the lake, was now subject to the NPDES permit
program authorized under Section 402 of the Clean
Water Act. See Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 531. In
the court’s view, Reserve Mining’s most recent
application for a Refuse Act permit to discharge process
wastewater into Lake Superior, sub mitred to the Army
Corps in 1971 but not acted on, automatically had been
converted into an NPDES permit application under
Section 402 upon the Clean Water Act’s enactment.
See id. The Eighth Circuit concluded that, while the
original permit Reserve Mining had received from the
Army Corps in 1960 remained valid with regard to the
navigational impacts of Reserve Mining’s dumping
the only impacts assessed by the Army Corps that
permit was not sufficient to authorize Reserve Mining’s
ongoing discharge of industrial wastes. Id. at 532. At
no point did the court even consider that the discharge
of process wastewater might be permitted under the
Corps’ Section 404 dredge and fill authority,
undoubtedly because mine waste clearly did not
constitute "fill." Id.6
~ The court’s treatment of Reserve Mining’s permit is
consistent with the mandate of 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5). It
also accords with Congress’s statement that "Section 402
transfers the 1899 Refuse Act permit program from the
Corps of Engineers to the Administrator [of EPA]." ALH at
321. See also ALH at 274 ("Section 402 transfers the
(continued...)
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Until the Corps’ issuance of the Coeur Alaska
permit, the Act was always understood to vest EPA
with sole authority to issue permits for wastewater
discharges. This understanding is evident not just in
the Reserve Mining case, but in others as well. For
example, just four years after the Act took effect, the
Homestake Mining Company was required to obtain a
Section 402 permit subject to pollution control
standards under Sections 301 and 306 before it could
discharge "waste water containing tailings, heavy
metals, and suspended solids" from its South Dakota
gold mine into navigable waters. United States v.
Homestake Mining Co., 595 F.2d 421,422-23 (8th Cir.
1979). Also in the 1970s, Iron Mountain Mines, Inc.,
was required to obtain a Section 402 permit for
discharges from a California mine that produced gold
and other ores. United States v. Iron Mountain Mines,
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(addressing liability issues).

6(...continued)
[discharge permit program] from the Army Corps to the
EPA, and provides a mechanism for the States to assume
full jurisdiction."). Indeed, after the Act’s passage in 1972,
the Army Corps ceded jurisdiction to EPA over all pending
applications under the Refuse Act. See, e.g., Highlights of
the Bill, Conference Report from House Debate, ALH at 362
("Pending applications under the Refuse Act program would
be transferred from the Corps of Engineers who are
administering the 1899 Refuse Act to the Environmental
Protection Agency who would initially be responsible for the
administration of the new program.").
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As a final point, petitioners’ argument, if
accepted, would not only end run the Act’s pollution
control requirements, but would also defeat the Act’s
goal of uniform treatment for companies engaged in
waste discharge. The National Association of Home
Builders ("NAHB") suggests the standards imposed by
Sections 301 and 306 are superfluous because the
Army Corps conducts an extensive analytical process
before issuing a Section 404 permit to ensure that no
serious environmental harm will result. But the caseby-case evaluations that NAHB touts and that the
Corps conducts cannot supplant EPA-issued standards.
Congress drafted the Clean Water Act to require EPA
to set industry-wide, science-based effluent standards
which take into account the burden a standard would
place on an industry. According to the 1972
Conference Report, "The conferees intend that the
[EPA] Administrator... will make the determination
of the economic impact of an effluent limitation on the
basis of classes and categories of point sources, as
distinguished from a plant by plant determination."
ALH at 304. Although a permit applicant may seek an
exception from an industry-wide standard, the burden
is a high one. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c). The caseby-case environmental review NAHB favors thus is
exactly the system that Congress rejected in the Clean
Water Act.7

7 The NAHB’s argument also confuses the distinctly
different roles served by EPA’s standard-setting and the
Corps’ environmental review. EPA’s job is to set uniform,
science-based discharge limits for industrial and municipal
discharges. The Corps’ review, in contrast, focuses on the
(continued...)
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As is evident, the Act’s text, purpose, and history
demonstrate that only EPA, and not the Corps, may
issue permits for the discharge of waste into waters of
the United States. Accordingly, the judgment below
should be affirmed.
II. The Corps’ Permit Is At Odds With
Settled Administrative Interpretation
Of The Clean Water Act.
Not only did the Corps’ issuance of a permit to
Coeur Alaska violate the Clean Water Act, it also
cannot be squared with longstanding administrative
interpretations of the Act on two key points first, the
strict limits on the Corps’ "dredge and fill" permitting
authority under Section 404 and second, the meaning
of the term "fill material." The Corps’ unexplained
and unprincipled departure from these long settled
agency views is yet another reason to affirm the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling.
A. The Corps’Authority Under Section 404 Does
Not Extend to Issuing Permits for the
Discharge of Mining Wastes as "Fill
Material. "
As noted, the Act was passed in 1972. By 1976,
the Army Corps had formally adopted definitions for

7(...continued)
environmental consequences of dredge and fill operations,
which can damage aquatic life and wetlands. See 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1344(c), (f)(1)(E).
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"fill material" and the "discharge of fill material,"
which acknowledged that the Corps’ authority was
limited to permits for fill needed for construction and
navigation projects. The Corps defined "fill material"
as material "used to create fill in the traditional sense
of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of
changing the bottom elevation of a water body for any
purpose," and "[d]ischarge of fill material" as "the
addition of fill material into navigable waters for the
purpose of creating fastlands, elevations of land
beneath navigable waters, or for impoundments of
water." 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120(d)(6), (7) (1976). In 1977,
the Army Corps clarified that waste materials were
excluded from its definition of fill materials. 42 Fed.
Reg. at 37,145 (excluding "any pollutant discharged
into the water primarily to dispose of waste"). At no
point did the Corps suggest that it could issue permits
authorizing the discharge of wastewater.
In the ensuing decades, the Army Corps
repeatedly reaffirmed its view that "fill material .... does
not include any pollutant discharged into the water
primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity is
regulated under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act."
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(m) (1977); 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)
(2001). According to the Army Corps’ "primary purpose
test," if material was placed in a water body for the
"primary purpose" of waste disposal, EPA had
permitting jurisdiction under Section 402. See 42 Fed.
Reg. at 37,145. Following that approach, a
Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") between the
Army Corps and EPA in 1986 listed mining wastes
among those discharges that required permits from
EPA under Section 402. 51 Fed. Reg. 8,871, 8,872
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(Mar. 14, 1986). The MOA also specified that a
discharge "in liquid, semi-liquid, or suspended form"
would be permitted by EPA pursuant to Section 402, as
well as "a discharge of solid material of a homogeneous
nature normally associated with single industry
wastes." Id. Discharges requiring permits from the
Corps under Section 404 included discharges having as
their "primary purpose" or "one principle purpose of
multi-purposes to replace a portion of the waters of the
United States with dry land or to raise the bottom
elevation," or discharges resulting "from activities such
as road construction or other activities where the
material to be discharged is generally identified with
construction-type activities." See id. at 8,872; see also
53 Fed. Reg. 20,764 (June 6, 1988).
To be sure, in 2002 the Army Corps changed
course when it adopted a new regulatory definition of
"fill material" that included any material the discharge
of which has the effect of elevating a water body,
regardless of whether the discharge is for construction
or navigation. 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,130. The breadth of
this new definition, coupled with the Corps’
abandonment of its "primary purpose" test, raised
questions about whether the Corps was encroaching on
the EPA’s permitting authority under Section 402.
To avoid jurisdictional conflict, EPA and the
Army Corps issued a joint statement that "this final
rule will not modify existing regulatory practice." 67
Fed. Reg. at 31,130. The agencies also agreed that not
every discharge with the effect of elevating water levels
could be considered fill material. In the proposed rule,
the agencies stated that no discharge subject to an
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EPA standard under Section 306 would be considered
"fill material." 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 21,299 (Apr. 20,
2000). In the final rule, the agencies explained that
they had deleted the clause excluding discharges
already subject to EPA standards because of concerns
raised in public comments that the language was
"vague" and "would result in uncertainty." 67 Fed.
Reg. at 31,135 ("In light of the concerns and confusion
associated with the proposed provision, we have
decided to delete it from the rule."). Instead, the
agencies specified that the re-definition would not
change permitting jurisdiction with regard to
discharges containing solids (such as mining waste):
Recognizing that some discharges (such
as suspended or settleable solids) can
have the associated effect, over time, of
raising the bottom elevation of a water
due to settling of waterborne pollutants,
we do not consider such pollutants to be
"fill material," and nothing in today’s rule
changes that view. Nor does today’s rule
change any determination we have made
regarding discharges that are subject to
an effluent limitation guideline and
standards, which will continue to be
regulated under section 402 of the CWA.
Id. The final rule also contains exceptions for trash
and sewage, which also would have fit squarely within
the new definition of fill material had they not been
exempted. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(3). In short, the
2002 rule-making maintained the status quo and
reaffirmed both agencies’ longstanding recognition that
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discharges subject to EPA-established effluent
limitations are required to be regulated by EPA under
Section 402.
The permit issued by the Corps to Coeur Alaska
violates these understandings. As stated above, for
over two decades EPA has imposed an industry-wide
zero discharge standard on froth-flotation mills such as
the one planned by Coeur Alaska, pursuant to the
NPDES permit program. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1)
("there shall be no discharge of process wastewater to
navigable waters from mills that use the froth-flotation
process.., for the beneficiation of copper, lead, zinc,
gold, silver, or molybdenum ores"). In addition, the
1986 MOA committed the Corps to defer to EPA to
permit mine waste as well as other waterborne
suspended solids, see 51 Fed. Reg. at 8872, a
commitment the Corps explicitly reaffirmed during its
2002 rule-making.
Therefore, according to the Corps’ promise to
maintain the regulatory status quo, it should have let
EPA decide whether to issue a permit for Coeur
Alaska’s planned discharge of process wastewater
under Section 402. It did not. Instead, in 2005, the
Army Corps disregarded both the MOA and the
statements it made along with EPA and issued a
Section 404 permit to Coeur Alaska. Making matters
worse, the Corps did not acknowledge, let alone
explain, why it changed course. The Army Corps’
failure to do so violates the longstanding rule that an
administrative agency must acknowledge and provide
a reasoned justification when it diverges from past
practice or policy. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
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v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Insur. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43
(1983). The Ninth Circuit was right to invalidate the
Corps’ permit on this ground as well.
The Corps’ Permit Is Contrary to Settled
Understanding of the Meaning of the Term
Fill Material.
The Corps has violated principles of reasoned
agency decision-making in yet another way: It has
robbed the term "fill material" of any meaning. As
explained above, the Corps’ permitting authority under
the Clean Water Act is limited to permits for "the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal sites." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
In an effort to arrogate authority denied to it by
Congress, the Corps has redefined "fill material" to
cover virtually any substance that can be dumped into
water so long as it raises the water level. But the term
"fill material" is a term of art that does not encompass
"waste," especially where, as here, the discharge is
unrelated to any construction or navigation project.
The terms "fill" and "fill material" are terms
with well-established meanings that the Corps is not
free to dismiss. See, e.g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U.S. 322,329 (1981) ("Where Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meanings.., a court must
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms."); accord United States v.
Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997). "Fill material" is a
term of art in the engineering field, referring to an
aggregated material that, when deposited in a space or
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gap, enhances stability. According to the Oxford
English Dictionary, in the 1800s a "fill" was "an
embankment to fill up a gully or hollow," used, for
example, in conjunction with "cuts" (i.e., grooves or
ditches) for laying railroad tracks. 5 Oxford English
Dictionary 908 (2nd ed. 1989) (def. I(2)(b)). In 1972,
the year the Act was enacted, the American Society of
Civil Engineers defined "fill" by its verb and noun
forms as: "Use of material, or material used to equalize
or to raise topography to a certain grade." American
Society of Civil Engineers, Definitions of Surveying
and Associated Terms 69 (1972). EPA’s website
currently defines "filling" as the act of "[d]epositing
dirt, mud or other materials into aquatic areas to
create more dry land, usually for agricultural or
commercial development purposes, often with ruinous
ecological consequences." EPA, Terms of Environment,
http!//www.epa, gov/OCEPAterms/fterms.html (May 14,
2007).
Building codes and construction ordinances offer
even more precise definitions of fill material and
"filling," none of which extends to waste. For instance,
Falmouth Maine’s building code states that "[~]ill
material shall mean clean soil material, rocks, bricks,
and cured concrete, which are not mixed with other
solid or liquid waste, and which are not derived from
an ore mining activity." Falmouth, Me., Code ch. 601
§ 5.34 (1991, 2003).
In the 1970s, "fill material" was used for many
purposes, such as to embank roads, extend airport
runways, or reclaim portions of a water body as dry
land. See, e.g., V.C. Edwards Contracting Co., Inc. v.
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Port of Tacoma, 503 P.2d 1133, 1136-37 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1972) (involving placement of "fill material" for
road embankment); Traigle v. Lafayette Airport
Comm’n, 309 So.2d 904, 905 (La. Ct. App. 1975)
(involving use of "fill material" to construct runway);
Agerton v. City of Lake Charles, 273 So.2d 353, 354 (La.
Ct. App. 1973) (involving placement of"fill material" to
reclaim dry land). Fill material was valued as a
saleable commodity, not mere waste. See, e.g., Rheault
v. Tennefos Constr. Co., Inc., 189 N.W.2d 626, 627-28
(N.D. 1971) (regarding unfulfilled contract to furnish
"fill material" at cost of $11,706 for use in roadbuilding),s
The Corps itself consistently embraced these
settled definitions of the terms "fill" and "fill material,"
in formal regulations, the MOA, and other statements
of agency policy. See infra at pp. 22-25. Despite the
"accumulated settled meanings" of the terms fill and
fill material, see Amax Coal, 453 U.S. at 329,
petitioners now contend that fill can mean any
material that can be dumped into water that might
raise the water level.
Petitioners’ argument has no limiting principle.
If petitioners’ reading of the statute is correct, a
s To be sure, fill material can contain recycled content.
Fill material often contains recycled and inexpensive
materials such as rock, gravel, sand, compacted soil, glass
chips, or concrete, depending on its engineering function,
but must be of a compaction density, moisture content, and
shear strength suited to its use. See, e.g., 4 Bruner &
O’Connor Construction Law § 14:10.
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company could dump any pollutant into navigable
waters of the United States and call it "fill," even if the
material’s discharge was otherwise forbidden by EPA
and even if the discharge was only for waste disposal
and not for construction or navigation. Any number of
harmful substances currently regulated by EPA would
become fair game, including wastes from dairy
products processing, grain mills, seafood processing,
cement manufacturers, leather tanning and finishing
facilities, and timber products operations. See 40
C.F.R. parts 405, 406, 408, 411, 425, and 429. There
would be little the Corps could not permit mining and
other companies to dump in waters of the United
States -- including toxic mine tailings containing
unlimited amounts of asbestos, arsenic, cyanide, and
sulphuric acid. Indeed, Coeur Alaska seeks to dump
waste containing mercury and lead. The Army Corps
cannot be allowed to cloak this discharge of toxic
wastes by calling it "fill."
Because the permit the Corps issued to Coeur
Alaska cannot be reconciled with longstanding agency
interpretations of the Corps’ role under the Act and the
meaning of "fill material," the Ninth Circuit properly
set it aside.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in
respondents’ brief, the judgment below should be
affirmed.
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